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EDITORIAL NOTES

MATTER OF JOSEPH CHAPMAN
In the stirring days of the late world war one Joseph Chapman pleaded guilty to a charge of murder in the criminal court
of Cook County. For that day-May 1, 1918-the clerk's journal
contains the following:
"13666-People v. Joseph Chapman.
"Parties and four jurors heretofore accepted and sworn present and on motion of each defendant and their counsel juror
Harry T. Smith withdrawn, jury discharged, plea of not guilty
(H. E.) withdrawn as to each defendant, plea of guilty entered
to the indictment as to each, defendants warned, testimony heard,
sentenced on plea to the penitentiary for the term of life as to
each defendant."'
In due course, it may be assumed, Chapman was incarcerated
in the Joliet Penitentiary. Years pass by until the 13th day of
December, 1927, is at hand. On that day, Harry W. Chapman,
brother of Joseph, filed in the Superior Court of Cook County,
before Judge Charles A. Williams a petition for habeas corpus.
He alleged that while brother Joseph pleaded guilty he failed to
persist in his plea, at least that the record failed to show affirmatively that Joseph persisted. Wherefore it was concluded that
the criminal court "was wholly without jurisdiction to accept"
the plea of guilty "and without such jurisdiction the judgment
under which said relator is held in custody is void."
On the 21st of December, 1927, Judge Williams decided that
Joseph Chapman was unlawfully held in custody and he ordered
his release. He agreed with the position stated in the petition for
habeas corpus. Also he advanced the sentimental notion that since
the time had passed for Chapman to review his case by writ of
error, he should have relief by habeas corpus. 2
A statute in Illinois provides as follows:
"In cases where the party pleads 'guilty' such plea shall not be
entered until the court shall have fully explained to the accused the
1. This is taken from a petition for habeas corpus as shown by the records of the Superior Court of Cook County. This record was printed in a
brief submitted on behalf of the People of Illinois to support a petition for
mandamus against Judge Charles A. Williams. The writer has been informed
that the letters "H. E." stand for the phrase "heretofore entered." He has
also been informed that Martin Clark was the other defendant. After about
three years in the penitentiary, he escaped and he is still at large.
2. For Judge Williams' point of view the writer is indebted to the brief
on behalf of the People; and also to the verified petition for mandamus
against Judge Williams. These statements are not denied in the brief filed on
behalf of respondent Williams even though there is a complaint that the statements violated the rules of the game. See also the statement by Mr. Justice
DeYoung in (1928) 330 Ill. 150, 161 N. E. 312.
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consequences of entering such plea; after which, if the party persist in
pleading 'guilty,' such plea shall be received and recorded, and the
court shall proceed to render judgment and execution thereon, as if
he had been found guilty by a jury. In all cases where the court
possesses any discretion as to the extent of the punishment, it shall
be the duty of the court to examine witnesses as to the aggravation
and mitigation of the offense."3
It seems to be. clear that Judge Williams in his decision was
justified by no precedent which fairly can be said to be in point.
At any rate the unanimous decision of the Supreme Court of
Illinois wasted few, if any, words before it ordered him to expunge his void order. 4 The statute has been before the appellate
courts in Illinois a number of times. So far as has been discovered, objections to judgments rendered under this statute have
been presented by means of a writ of error. Furthermore there
have been utterances of the Supreme Court of Illinois which
should have made judge Williams cautious about interfering with
a judgment of a court of "concurrent" jurisdiction rather than
bold to make free a self-confessed murderer. 5
Making allowance for temporary absences and vacancies there
are twenty circuit judges and twenty-eight superior judges in
Cook County. No emphasis need be placed upon the fact that
judges from other counties are brought to Cook County from
time to time. They tend to equalize the local judges used in the
trial of criminal cases. It is an undesirable system that will
permit one of these judges to grant a habeas corpus writ in favor
of a person held by virtue of a judgment rendered in the criminal court of Cook County. However, this seems to be possible
under the habeas corpus law. Apparently there is nothing to
prevent a person seeking a writ from privately interviewing judges
until he finds a favorable one. Then he can be chosen as the one
before whom the application will be filed and presented in a
formal way. In the criminal court there is a rule of court which
requires all applications for writs of habeas corpus, to be passed
upon by a judge of that court, to be filed with the chief justice
of the criminal court. He then assigns them in rotation to judges
in the criminal court. (All of this seems to show that Cook
County, at least, needs court-made rather than legislative rules
of procedure. More important, possibly, is the need for a re3. Sec. 4, div. 13 of Crim. Code; Cahill "Statutes" (1927) p. 952; Smith
"Statutes" (1927) p. 1019.
4. People v. Williams (1928) 330 Ill. 150, 161 N. E. 312.
5. People v. Murphy (1904) 212 Ill. 584, 589; People v. Superior Court
(1908) 234 Ill. 186, 204.
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organization of the courts which will provide a system which
has a chief justice with power to organize a modern system of
courts, with appointive instead of elective clerks, and with responsibility upon the chief justice to make the system work. But American judges, as a rule, are highly individualistic and a subordination of the individual to an efficient system is likely to come about
slowly and painfully.)
It is fascinating to speculate on the sort of a judicial mind
that without precedent and against the customary way of handling
the matter would turn loose upon society a murderer by his own
confession upon what Kipling perhaps would call a "filthy" technicality. It seems to be the sort of action that one hardly could
imagine in England or Canada today. Yet it is feared that in
the United States too many judges would delight in such action
and with a heave of the chest would think that they were true
followers of all the noble documents of freedom from Magna
Charta down to date. There is something wrong with the mental
training of many lawyers. We confuse that which is merely clever
with true wisdom. Not infrequently we exalt lawyers who have
a devilish ingenuity for thwarting the social consequences of our
law. It is only necessary to recall that Mr. Chief Justice Taft
once delivered himself upon the disgraceful way in which the
criminal law is administered in this country and that Mr. Justice
Clarke once wrote in warning that lawyers were in danger of
becoming a group of casuists.
It will be recalled that Judge Williams added sentiment to
his logic. He fortified his action by stating that Chapman was
too late for a writ of error and that this was an additional reason
for granting habeas corpus. To this there seem to be two answers
as stated in the People's brief. In the first place, even if the
matter were controlled by the practice act Chapman had three
years in which to prosecute his writ of error. Three years should
be enough for any man and under the circumstances the sentiment
expressed by Judge Williams becomes mawkish. In the second
place, the Supreme Court of Illinois in 1921 held' that the three
year limitation in the practice act did not apply to criminal trials.
In that decision the court approved a writ of error sued out more
than five years after the plaintiff in error had been sentenced.
The only suggested limitation on a writ of error in a criminal trial
was the common law limitation of twenty years.
6. People v. Murphy (1921) 296 IIl. 532.
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Therein lies another sad aspect of the Chapman case. Recently, according to newspaper items, Chapman has been captured
under circumstances indicating that he is a truly desperate character, and he has been returned to the penitentiary in Joliet. Apparently, under the decision above specified there will be. nothing
to prevent Joseph from applying for a writ of error at any time
before May 1, 1938. If he does, it seems likely that the judgment
against him will be reversed and his cause remanded. The appellate courts in this state have been strict in exacting compliance
with the statute above set forth.7 This prospect makes the situation somewhat ridiculous. What possible reason is there to permit a convicted person to sue out a writ of error at any time
within twenty years? Three months should be sufficient. At
least one's general reading has brought forth the belief that in
England as a rule there is a final disposition of criminal appeals
within that time. What is done there is possible here. It is submitted that criminal procedure in Illinois needs to be renovated
7. Krolage v. People (1906) 224 Ill. 457; People v. Fulimon (1923) 308
Ill. 235; People v. Petrie (1920) 294 Ill. 366; People v. Benner (1922) 224 Ill.
App. 515; People v. Glick (1916) 200 Ill. App. 46; cf. People v. Pennington
(1915) 267 Ill. 45; People v. Ellsworth (1913) 261 Ill. 275; People v. Conrad
(1921) 299 Ill. 473; People v. Harney (1916) 276 Ill. 236; People v. Siracusa
(1916) 275 Ill. 457; Marx v. People (1903) 204 Ill. 248.
It should be noticed that according to the record Chapman was merely
"warned." There is no recitation that the court "fully explained to the
accused the consequences of entering such plea," to use the language of the

Illinois statute. Then, to repeat, the record does not show that Chapman persisted in pleading guilty after being warned.
What would happen if Chapman should bring these defects before the

Supreme Court on a writ of error, and if that court should determine that the
writ was properly sued out? The practice as set forth in the above cases has
been to reverse the judgment and remand the cause for further action not
inconsistent with the opinion. Where would this leave the People? Apparently Chapman would be in a position to ask leave to withdraw his plea of

guilty with a view to requesting. a jury trial. While this request has been said
to be a matter for the discretion of the judge hearing the motion still it is
fairly clear that the Supreme Court favors such a request unless the circumstances are unusual. See Gardner v. People (1883) 106 Ill.76; Krolage v.
People (1906) 224 Ill. 456; People v. Walker (1911) 250 Ill. 427. In this connection, in People v. Kolb (1925) 238 Ill. App. 173, the court reversed and
remanded'the judgment with directions to set aside the plea of guilty and then
specified that the plaintiff in error niight move to quash the information if he
so desired.
If Chapman should ever obtain a jury trial through this- process it is not
necessary to do more than mention the disadvantage to the People with refer.
ence to lost witnesses, lapsed memories, and sympathy.

CORRESPONDENCE

and placed in shape to meet the conditions of the present day.8
KENNETH C. SEAs.

CORRESPONDENCE
CHOOSING AN EXECUTOR

To the Editors of ILLINOIS LAW REVIEW:
Mr. Cutter's article on the choice of an executor, in your February issue, is very interesting and he has analyzed the viewpoint
of the testator with much thoroughness. There can be no question
but that honesty, loyalty and first class business ability are absolutely
essential qualities in an executor. These must come first. Assuming then, that these qualities are present and that our executors
are men of good business judgment, we may feel confident that
they will secure expert advice wherever needed on questions of
law, real estate, taxes, investments, and accounting. In such a case
there is every likelihood that the estate will be efficiently handled.
If an estate be of large proportions, usually four or five executors, including a lawyer of high standing and a trust company, are
appointed, and the formation of such a group tends towards a most
capable management of the estate. Under such circumstances each
executor is on his mettle and gives of his best. Self interest seldom
intrudes, as might be the case, were a single executor exercising
sole control.
Mr. Cutter stresses the value of continuity in an executorship.
He also brings out with great force the importance of the personal
element--of a friendly interest on the part of the executors towards
the testator's family. These points cannot be too strongly emphasized. The testator when choosing his executors wants them
upon his death to manage his property and business as he would
manage that of a valued friend were he acting as that friend's executor. He also desires his executors in their policy towards his wife.
children, and other beneficiaries to maintain the same spirit and
interest as he himself would, if living. This policy and this attitude
on the part of his executors may be confidently expected where
those in control of his estate are business friends who for many
years have been interested in him and his family. With such men
acting as executors and a proper provision for substitutes, the testator has gained assurance not merely of a permanent policy for
handling his estate, but also of a friendly and sympathetic relationship between his executors and those for whose benefit his will is
made.
Where a bank or trust company is acting as sole executor,
a different situation is presented. While, as executor a bank pro8. The author wishes to acknowledge his indebtedness to judge Q. J.
Chott, Assistant State's Attorney, and Giles H. Penstone, student in the University of Chicago Law School, for valuable assistance in the preparation of
these comments.

